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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Priority No. 2

v.

:

DIANE MARIE NELSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970163-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(j)(1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly determine that the victim's eyewitness
testimony was constitutionally reliable and thus admissible?
A trial court's decision to admit eyewitness identification evidence is a
question of law that is reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774, 782 n. 3 (Utah 1991); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993). This
"correctness review necessarily incorporates a review of the trial court's resolution of

factual questions and the associated determination of credibility that may underlie the
decision to admit." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782 n. 3, 778. Such subsidiary findings will be
overturned only if clearly erroneous. Id. Here, the facts below were uncontroverted,
consequently there are no factual questions for review.
2. Is the evidence sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that
defendant acted as an accomplice to the aggravated robbery?
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, this Court views the evidence and
the inferences from it in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Strain, 885
P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994). The Court may reverse for insufficient evidence "only
when the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." Id.
(citation omitted). See also State v. Dunn 850 P.2d, 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993). However,
defendant's claim of insufficient evidence is either waived or constitutes invited error
because she conceded below that the victim's testimony, if believed, was sufficient to
establish all the elements of aggravated robbery.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions are
contained in addendum F.

a

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995).
Threshold Eyewitness Reliability Determination
Defendant moved to suppress the victim's eyewitness identification
testimony claiming that it was unreliable under the federal and state constitutions (R. 17)
(a copy is attached as addendum A). The State filed a memorandum in opposition to
defendant's motion, setting forth the relevant facts and arguing the admissibility of the
eyewitness testimony under criteria set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah
1991) (R.33-44) (a copy is attached as addendum B).
As the facts were uncontroverted, a non-evidentiary hearing was held (R.
162-69) (a copy of the suppression transcript is attached as addendum C). Defendant was
prepared to call an expert, who had reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript, to testify
about the different factors impacting the eye witness identification, including "the
darkness, the shortness of the period of time,... the cross-cultural issue,... [and the]
show-up procedure, where [defendant] was handcuffed infrontof a patrol car" (R. 162,
169, see addendum C). The trial court, observing that there was nothing "highly unusual"
about the victim's eyewitness identification testimony in this case, declined to hear the
defendant's expert (R. 162, see addendum C). Rather, the trial court denied defendant's
3

motion and admitted the eyewitness identification evidence, further ruling that both
parties were entitled to call experts to testify concerning the weight jurors should accord
the eyewitness testimony under Ramirez, and that the jury would be instructed regarding
those factors under State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986) (R. 162, 169, see
addendum C).
Jury Instructions
The trial court rejected proposed instructions from both defendant and the
prosecutor concerning the unsupported theory that defendant's conduct did not amount to
aggravated robbery. Defendant requested to instruct the jury that "where there are two
possible explanations for the conduct of the defendant, and by one explanation the
defendant would not be responsible, then the prosecution has failed to make out a case
against the defendant and he (sic) must be acquitted" (R. 86 (proposed instruction), R.
370, a copy of the conference on jury instructions is attached as addendum D). The trial
court rejected the instruction, observing that defendant's theory was misidentification, not
reduced culpability; therefore, there were not two possible explanations for defendant's
conduct (R. 370-71, see addendum D). Trial counsel agreed, stating: "I think you're
correct. Our primary argument is the identification procedures" (id). The trial court
accordingly declined to give the requested instruction (id.).
The trial court also rejected the State's request to instruct the jury on the
lesser included offense of robbery (R. 366-67, see addendum D). The State was
4

concerned that the jury might find the knife was not a dangerous weapon (id). Defendant
opposed the lesser included instruction (R. 373-74, see addendum D).
The trial court reiterated that the case turned on the victim's eyewitness
testimony, and that there was no theory of the case that defendant committed simple
robbery: "[I]f they find the witnesses credible enough to convict, then the testimony had
to do with a weapon, and it becomes ag (sic) robbery" (R. 374, see addendum D).
The prosecutor expressed an additional concern that the jury would find
defendant did not intend that her cohort use a knife, but that she did intend to commit a
robbery (id.). On that ground, the prosecutor argued that both an aggravated robbery and
a simple robbery instruction were appropriate (id.).
The trial court remained disinclined to the give the lesser included
instruction, observing that the knife constituted the only evidence of threatening conduct
for purposes of robbery and aggravated robbery (R. 375, see addendum D). The
prosecutor disagreed, and reiterated his concern that "the jury could find that she intended
for him to get the shoes, but exceeded, basically, her authority or agency by using the
knife" (R. 376-77, see addendum D).
Turning to defendant's trial counsel, the trial court inquired if he planned to
make that argument and indicated that in her view it would be inappropriate:
It doesn't matter what [defendant] intended. She intended to
have him get [the shoes] for her, and then he engages in this
conduct. She has solicited, encouraged it. She doesn't need
5

to know he's going to pull out a knife. She merely needs to
be present for it and to have solicited it or encouraged it or
aided and assisted in any other way.
(R. 377-78, see addendum D).
The prosecutor interjected that he was concerned that it was unclear to the
jury that the mental state did not go to the use of a specific weapon, but rather to the
commission of the crime (R. 378, see addendum D). The trial court told the prosecutor
that it was his responsibility to make that argument and that she was still disinclined to
give the lesser included instruction (id.).
Turning again to trial counsel, the trial court cautioned him against arguing
that defendant's conduct did not amount to aggravated robbery on the ground that he had
no evidence to support the argument (id.). Trial counsel responded that he had not made
that argument in his opening statement (id.). The trial court asked trial counsel to clarify
his argument and he responded as follows:
Well, we said it in opening, that it's an interesting case, and
even if you look at the conduct, and the question, is, is the
conduct even a crime? Which is what we had already argued.
The conduct is a crime, if the jury finds the witness is
credible, it is a crime to take somebody's shoes, or threaten to
take them at knife point. And even if she isn V the one with the
knife, if they find she was the one there soliciting,
encouraging the conduct, then it's aggravated robbery under
the elements.

6

(R. 378-79, see addendum D) (emphasis added). Based on trial counsel's concession, that
if the jury believed the victim's testimony, the evidence was sufficient to convict
defendant for aggravated robbery, the trial court declined to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of robbery (R. 379, see addendum D). The trial court indicated that she
would monitor trial counsel to make sure he did not "walk over the line" (id.).
Conviction
Following a one-day trial held on 4 November 1996, the jury convicted
defendant as charged (R. 124, 128).
Sentence
The trial court imposed afive-to-lifeterm of imprisonment and a $10,000
fine which sentence was stayed and a three year probationary term imposed (R. 138).
Appeal
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (R.
140). The case was poured over to this Court on 24 February 1997 (R. 156).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Just as it was getting dark on the evening of 1 July 1996, Amy Brown
parked her truck in the vicinity of 300 West and 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and
began walking to her apartment a "few feet" away (R. 310-16). Defendant and two male
cohorts were standing by some dumpsters in the southeast area of the apartment complex,
five to six feet away from Ms. Brown (R. 312). As Ms. Brown approached, defendant
7

commented on her shoes, stating, "Nice shoes," and "I like your shoes" (R. 312). Ms.
Brown looked at defendant "out of the corner of her eye," but otherwise ignored
defendant's comment and continued walking west toward her apartment (R. 313-14, 326).
When Ms. Brown was within three to four feet of the trio, defendant turned to one of her
cohorts stating, "I like her shoes," and then in a more demanding tone, defendant
commanded her cohort to "Get them for me" (R. 314-15). Defendant's cohort
immediately pulled an 18" knife from behind his back and pointing it at Ms. Brown,
stated, "Give her the shoes" (R. 314-16, 329). Chased after by defendant's cohort, Ms.
Brown ran to her apartment and called 911 (R. 302, 316). Police dispatch received Ms.
Brown's call at 9:53 p.m. (R. 336). Ms. Brown estimated that the entire incident lasted
approximately 30 seconds (R. 328).
Although it was after dark, the dumpster area was sufficiently lighted that
Ms. Brown had no difficulty seeing the three cohorts prior to the attack (R. 313, 332).
Ms. Brown, who is Caucasian, observed that defendant was a Black female, had short,
curly hair, and was nicely dressed in pants and a shirt (R. 314). Other than defendant,
her two white male accomplices, and Ms. Brown, there were no other people in the area
(R.313).
Shortly after 10:00 p.m., police arrived to investigate the incident (R. 302,
336). Based on Ms. Brown's descriptions of her assailants, Officer DeGraw detained
defendant, whom he had observed hanging around on 300 South, near the dumpsters,
8

when he arrived (R. 337, 340-43). Officer DeGraw had no difficulty seeing defendant
who was standing on the edge of the street in a "more well lit area" (R. 338). He
observed no other people in the vicinity (R. 337). Police apprehended defendant a short
while later as she came out of an alley north of the dumpsters (R. 342).
Within 30 minutes of the aggravated robbery, police told Ms. Brown that
they had "somebody" that she "might want to come and look at" (R. 320). A flashlight
was shown on defendant's face while she was handcuffed, standing next to a patrol car
(R. 321, 331). From a distance of 15 feet, Ms. Brown immediately recognized defendant,
by her hair, face and clothing, as the woman who had earlier demanded her shoes (R.
321).1
As Officer DeGraw transported her to jail, defendant stated, "I didn't do
anything. I didn't do anything. Maybe Cody or Brad did something, but I didn't do
anything" (R. 345).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The facts surrounding Ms. Brown's eyewitness identification of defendant
were not controverted below. Rather, defendant focused primarily on the weight to be
accorded Ms. Brown's testimony under factors discussed in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d

1

Police also asked Ms. Brown to identify a white male suspect fitting her
description of defendant's cohort, but Ms. Brown determined that he was not one of
defendant's accomplices (R. 344-45).
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774 (Utah 1991). Therefore, defendant's claims of unresolved factual disputes are
waived.
Even if the Court considers the merits of defendant's claim, it is
unreasonable, on this record, to leap to the conclusion that the trial court abandoned its
gatekeeping responsibilities under Ramirez because it did not enter findings in support of
its admissibility ruling. The facts were uncontroverted below, the parties and the trial
court were aware of and focused on Ramirez' requirement of a threshold admissibility
ruling, and the trial court ultimately ruled that the eyewitness testimony was admissible.
The record is thus adequate for this Court to perform its appellate review function. While
it is always preferable for trial courts considering the reliability of eyewitness testimony
to enter formal Ramirez findings, even on uncontroverted facts, the failure to do so here
does not constitute reversible error. Rather, it is reasonable to find facts in support of the
admissibility ruling; therefore, the Court should affirm the decision below.
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is at bottom, an
unpreserved claim of statutory interpretation and instructional error. Because defendant
failed to raise these issues below and even assured the trial court that the victim's
testimony was adequate, if credible, to establish the elements of aggravated robbery,
defendant's sufficiency claim is waived or amounts to invited error and should be
rejected.
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Even if the Court deems defendant to have raised a valid sufficiency claim,
the claim should still be rejected because defendant fails to properly marshal the evidence
supporting the jury verdict and to demonstrate its insufficiency. In claiming a paucity of
the evidence, defendant draws only those inference favorable to her claims of
insufficiency and wholly ignores those reasonable inferences that support the jury's
verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION WERE UNCONTROVERTED
BELOW; THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF
UNRESOLVED FACTUAL DISPUTES ARE WAIVED
AND THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE
FACTS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
THRESHOLD ADMISSIBILITY RULING
A. Waiver
Defendant complains that the trial court failed to make a threshold
determination of the constitutional reliability of Ms. Brown's eyewitness testimony as
required by State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Br. of Aplt. at 10. She bases her
claim on the absence of factual findings in support of the trial court's admissibility ruling.
Br. of Aplt. at 13-15. However, defendant made no request for Ramirez findings below,
and, as the facts were uncontroverted, there was no necessity that factual findings be
entered here. Indeed, defendant did not controvert the facts in her motion to suppress (R.
11

17, see addendum A), or at the non-evidentiary hearing (R. 161-69, see addendum C).
Defendant focused instead on proffered expert testimony challenging the reliability of the
victim's identification of defendant on the uncontroverted facts (id.). Accordingly,
defendant's complaints about the lack of Ramirez findings and unresolved factual
disputes are waived. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994) (declining to hear
state due process claim under Ramirez "that [was] not raised at trial."); State v. Olsen, 860
P.2d 332 (Utah 1993) (finding defendant waived state due process claim by failing to
object when trial court admitted eyewitness identification evidence without first holding
evidentiary hearing).
B. Ramirez Assumption Applies
Even if this Court considers the merits of defendant's claim, under the
circumstances of this case, it is unreasonable to leap to the conclusion that the trial court
abandoned its gatekeeping responsibilities under Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778, in
determining to admit the eyewitness testimony. At the time of its admissibility ruling on
9 October 1996, the trial court had before it the State's memorandum setting forth the
relevant facts and discussing the admissibility of the eyewitness evidence under Ramirez
(R. 33-44, see addendum B). As the facts were uncontroverted, the only issue for
resolution was a legal one: the threshold, constitutional admissibility of the eyewitness
identification mandated in Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778. Ramirez itself recognizes that it
will not be necessary for the trial court to make findings in all cases, particularly where
12

there is no conflicting testimony. 817 P.2d at 778 (prosecution "must lay a foundation
upon which the trial court can make any necessary preliminary factual findings and reach
any necessary legal conclusions"), and 782 n.3 ("the trial judge may have to weigh
conflicting testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the confession or
identification") (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further held in Ramirez, that in the
absence of factual findings on necessary factual issues, the reviewing court should
"assume that the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision," and "affirm the
decision iffromthe evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it." 817 P.2d
at 787. It is reasonable to apply the Ramirez assumption in this case.
Although, the Supreme Court has identified three instances when the
Ramirez assumption cannot be made, these instances are not triggered here. State v.
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997). Specifically, the Ramirez assumption does
not apply
when an ambiguity of the facts makes the assumption
unreasonable, if the statute explicitly provides that written
findings must be made, or when a prior cases states that
findings on a particular issue must be made to impress upon
the trial court the importance of the issue so as to ensure that
we can properly perform our appellate review function.
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). No statute
explicitly provides that findings be made in this instance and, for reasons set forth below,
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defendant fails to show that either of the other two Robertson exceptions to the Ramirez
assumption apply here.
This is not a case where an ambiguity of the facts makes the Ramirez
assumption unreasonable. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224. Even if the Court deems
defendant's claims to be properly before it, defendant points to no facts or circumstances
that undermine the trial court's threshold admissibility ruling. Defendant claims that the
"most troubling conflict" concerns the fact whether defendant was handcuffed at the time
of the showup. Br. of Aplt. at 18. Ms. Brown and her husband both testified that
defendant was handcuffed, while Officer DeGraw testified that she was not; therefore, the
weight of the evidence suggests that defendant was handcuffed at the time of the
identification (R. 303, 321, 354). Under Ramirez, this fact does not render Ms. Brown's
testimony constitutionally unreliable. The Ramirez robber was similarly handcuffed, yet
the eyewitness testimony in that case was deemed properly admitted. 817 P.2d at 784.
Defendant's further complaints about alleged conflicts between the
witnesses' descriptions of the lighting conditions are unsupported in the record. All three
witnesses, Ms. Brown, her husband and Officer DeGraw, agreed that it was dark, but that
there was lighting in vicinity of the dumpsters (R. 294-95, 332-333, 338). Specifically,
Ms. Brown testified that it was lighter in the dumpster area than the surrounding areas and
that it was sufficiently light for her to see her assailants (R. 332). Ms. Brown's husband
viewed the area shortly after the incident and indicated only that there were street lights in
14

the alley leading to 300 South, but that there were no street lights on 300 South itself (R.
294). He further indicated that the dumpsters were located "down the alley way towards
[300] South" (R. 294-95). Officer DeGraw testified that the dumpster area was not well
lit, but that "there are a few street lights that make it possible to see the people in the area
and stuff9 (R. 338). Consequently, neither Mr. Brown's nor Officer DeGraw's testimony
is inconsistent with Ms. Brown's testimony that it was lighter in the area of the
dumpsters, and/or that the dumpster area was sufficiently lighted for her to see defendant
(R. 332-33).
To the extent the witnesses' descriptions of the lighting conditions do vary,
those variances bear on their credibility and on the weight jurors could accord their
testimony, but they do not render Ms. Brown's testimony constitutionally unreliable.
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648 (Utah App. 1992) (holding that differences between
witnesses original description of suspect and defendant's actual appearance bear on
witness credibility and on weight accorded that testimony, but does not render
identification inadmissible), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). This is true also of
defendant's complaints that Ms. Brown did not get a long enough look at defendant, that
she paid more attention to the male accomplices, that the drawn knife became the focus of
her attention, that she was hysterical after the incident and upon identifying defendant,
that she overestimated defendant's height, that she had trouble remembering what
defendant wore in her preliminary hearing testimony, and that she is Caucasian and that
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defendant is Black. These are all considerations for the jury in deciding what weight to
accord Ms. Brown's testimony. Id. They do not, either individually or together, render
her testimony inadmissible. Id. Defendant thus fails to show any ambiguity in the facts
that would make application of the Ramirez assumption unreasonable.
It is a closer question whether application of the Ramirez assumption is
appropriate under the third instance noted in Robertson, when a prior case requires
findings "to impress upon the trial court the importance of the issue so as to ensure that
[the reviewing court] can properly perform [its] appellate review function." 932 P.2d
1234. Robertson lists two examples of such cases, both requiring trial courts to enter
findings and conclusions regarding the admission of hearsay testimony of child sex abuse
victims. 932 P.2d at 1225 (citing State v. Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29, 34 (Utah) (holding that
after consideration of all statutory and other relevant factors, "the court must make
written findings and conclusions with respect to each factor"), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814
(1989); and State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355 n.3 (Utah 1986) (holding that trial court
"should" enter findings and conclusions regarding statutory factors to explain its
reasoning for admitting or excluding testimony)). Notably, although Ramirez strongly
cautions trial courts against "sidestepping" their responsibility to perform the required
constitutional admissibility analysis, id. at 778, Robertson does not list Ramirez as a case
requiring findings and conclusions in all instances. 932 P.2d at 1225. As noted
previously, Ramirez requires findings only when necessary, or when there is conflicting
16

testimony. 817 P.2d 778, 782 n.3. While it is always preferable for trial courts
considering the reliability of eyewitness testimony to enter formal Ramirez findings, even
on uncontroverted facts, the failure to do so here does not amount to reversible error. The
record is adequate for this Court to properly perform its appellate review function.
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1225.
C. Ramirez Analysis Supports Admissibility Ruling
As recognized by the trial court, there is nothing "highly unusual" about the
facts of the eyewitness identification in this case (R. 162, see addendum C). Review of
the Ramirez factors supports the trial court's observation. The first Ramirez factor takes
into account the eyewitnesses opportunity to view the suspect. Id. at 782. The Ramirez
robber was masked, crouched down, and viewed from ten to thirty feet away, id.;
defendant was unmasked, standing sufficiently erect as to get some idea of her height, and
was viewed from as close as three to four feet and only as far away as five to six feet (R.
313-15). Although Ms. Brown looked at defendant out of the comer of her eye, nothing
in the record indicates that she was unable to see defendant's full face (R. 326). The
Ramirez eyewitness, on the other hand, only saw a portion of the robber's masked face.
Ramirez at 784. The fact that defendant's accomplice thereafter chased Ms. Brown does
not detract from her initial view of defendant, even if that view lasted a few seconds. See
State v. WilletU 909 P.2d 218, 220, 224 (Utah 1995) (finding eyewitness' "few seconds"
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observation of defendant "sufficiently reliable" to be admitted). Moreover, there were no
distracting noises or activity at the time. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782.
Ms. Brown's degree of attention to, and capacity to observe defendant were
also sufficient for purposes of the second and third Ramirez factors. Ms. Brown's
attention was drawn to defendant immediately upon hearing defendant speak to her (R.
326). She wanted to and did look at defendant as the individual who had commented on
her shoes (id). Although Ms. Brown experienced stress prior to, and fright during the
incident, nothing in the record suggests that she was hindered in her ability to see
defendant clearly (R. 333). Identification of the Ramirez robber, on the other hand, was
hindered by the fact that his accomplice was assaulting the eyewitness with a pipe during
the robbery, 817 P.2d 783. Here, Ms. Brown looked at defendant before she was assailed
by defendant's knife-wielding accomplice (R. 326-27). The record is further devoid of
indication that Ms. Brown acted under any personal motivation, bias, or prejudice, or that
her vision was poor, or that she was impaired by fatigue, injury, drugs or alcohol.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783.
The fourth Ramirez factor takes into account the spontaneity and
consistency of the eyewitness identification. Id. Ms. Brown identified defendant a mere
30 minutes after the incident and her identification has remained consistent since that
time (R. 312). See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (noting that elapsed time of 30 minutes to an
hour between crime and witness identification was minimal). It is not unusual that Ms.
18

Brown was agitated orfrightenedby the aggravated robbery; importantly, the record
gives no indication that her mental capacity and state of mind inhibited her ability to
correctly identify defendant and/or her cohorts (R. 333). Ms. Brown also looked at a
male suspect, but determined that he was not one of defendant's cohorts (R. 344-45). As
noted previously, Ms. Brown overestimated defendant's height, but that discrepancy goes
to the weight of her testimony, and not its threshold admissibility. Mincy, 838 P.2d at
658.
The final and most critical Ramirez factor concerns the suggestibility of the
showup itself. Like the showup in Ramirez, the instant showup was likely, "blatantly
suggestive." 817 P.2d at 784. Both suspects were identified in handcuffs, at night on a
city street, in close proximity to police officers. Compare id and (R. 321, 331). Despite
these problems in Ramirez, and acknowledging that they created "an extremely close
case," the admission of the eyewitness identification testimony in that case was upheld.
817 P.2d at 784. Because the circumstances surrounding Ms. Brown's eyewitness
identification are no more problematic than those in Ramirez, the admission of her
eyewitness identification testimony was proper and should be upheld. See also State v.
Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1234, 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (upholding admissibility of
eyewitness identification despite blatantly suggestive showup where defendant was
surrounded by officers and illuminated by patrol car headlights), cert, denied,
, (Utah November 28,1995).
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Based on the above, the record supports the trial court's admissibility
determination. Defendant points to no undermining inadequacy. Therefore, the Court
should apply the Ramirez assumption and uphold the admissibility ruling.
POINT U
DEFENDANT CONCEDED BELOW THAT, IF
CREDIBLE, THE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY SUFFICED
TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY; THEREFORE, HER CONTRARY CLAIM
ON APPEAL IS EITHER WAIVED OR AMOUNTS TO
INVITED ERROR
Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction
as an accomplice to the aggravated robbery. Significantly, defendant does not dispute
that the evidence sufficiently established that an aggravated robbery took place, or that
she was involved. Rather, defendant's sufficiency challenge rests on a theory of statutory
construction. Defendant claims that the accomplice and aggravated robbery statutes
imply a requirement that the State prove an accomplice has knowledge that the principal
will use a dangerous weapon. Br. of Aplt. at 23. Based on this statutory interpretation,
defendant argues that the State failed to introduce any evidence that she knew her cohort
would draw a knife on the victim and therefore the evidence is insufficient. Br. of Aplt.
at 25. However, defendant conceded below that the victim's testimony, if credible,
sufficed to establish the elements of aggravated robbery. Her contrary claim on appeal is
thus waived, or else amounts to invited error.
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A. Waiver/Invited Error
Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence do not require preservation;
however, on appeal, defendants may not argue a factual or legal position contrary to that
they asserted in the trial court. Rather, a sufficiency challenge directly attacks the
reasonability of the jury's decision. An appellate court will reverse a conviction for lack
of evidence only when the evidence and all reasonable inferences, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, uis sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt..." State v.
James, 819 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah 1991).
The reasonableness of the jury's verdict necessarily turns on whether the
evidence satisfies the elements on which the trial court instructed them. In this case, the
trial court instructed the jury in the statutory language. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-2202 (1995) (accomplice liability); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995) (aggravated
robbery); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1996) (robbery) (copies of the pertinent
statutes are attached in addendum F), and (R. 105, 107-110) (copies of the elements
instructions are attached as addendum E). Petitioner raised no objection and requested no
clarifying instruction (R. 366-79, see addendum D).2 Defendant does not contend that the

2

The only objection defendant raised to jury instructions below was to the
court's reasonable doubt instruction (R. 416).
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evidence, viewed in light of the jury instructions given, insufficiently establishes her
guilt. Br. of Aplt. at 23-26.
Rather, the gravamen of defendant's claim is that the accomplice and
aggravated robbery statutes require proof that an accomplice to aggravated robbery must
know that the principal will use a weapon, and that the trial court should have so
instructed the jury. However, petitioner never asked the trial court to consider the novel
statutory interpretation she now asks this Court to impose; moreover, she raises no claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Unlike a sufficiency claim, questions of statutory
construction and/or instructional error are waived if not raised at trial. See, e.g., Utah R.
Crim. P. 19(c); State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 n.2 (Utah App. 1996) (declining to hear
sufficiency claim to the extent it incorporated unpreserved question of statutory
construction), cert, denied, 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997).
More importantly, in light of trial counsel's concession that the victim's
testimony, if deemed credible by the jury, was sufficient to establish all the elements of
aggravated robbery, defendant's claim constitutes invited error. As set out more fully in
the Statement of Case, pp.5-8, supra, trial counsel assured the trial court that he would
not argue defendant's reduced culpability based on the fact that her cohort, and not
defendant, handled the weapon:
The conduct is a crime, if the jury finds the witness is
credible, it is a crime to take somebody's shoes, or threaten to
take them at knife point. And even if she isn't the one with
22

the knife, if they find she was the one there soliciting,
encouraging the conduct, then it's aggravated robbery under
the elements.
(R. 378-79, see addendum D). Defendant thus disclaimed below the exact theory he now
posits in this Court. Defendant's theory below was misidentification, not reduced
culpability (id).
The policy undergirding the invited error doctrine is that the trial court
"should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error," and that parties should
be discouraged from intentionally misleading the trial court "so as to preserve a hidden
ground for reversal on appeal." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1996).
Therefore, having lead the trial court to believe that the victim's testimony, if credible,
was sufficient to establish the elements of aggravated robbery, and that her defense
strategy was to therefore claim misidentification, defendant may not now take advantage
of any consequent deficiency in the jury instructions. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah
1993) ("A party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led
the trial court into committing the error.").
B. Failure to Marshall
Even if the Court deems defendant's claim to constitute a legitimate
sufficiency challenge, defendant has not marshalled the evidence and shown that it is
inadequate to support the jury's verdict. In order to establish a claim of insufficiency of
the evidence, defendant must marshal all the evidence in support of the verdict and
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demonstrate that, even viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support it. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994); Dunn, 850
P.2d at 1212. The Court may reverse for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for
which she was convicted. Id.
Defendant fails to meet this heavy burden. In claiming a paucity of the
evidence to demonstrate that she knew her cohort would draw a knife on the victim,
defendant draws only those inference favorable to her claims of insufficiency and wholly
ignores those reasonable inferences that support the jury's verdict. Br. of Aplt. at 25-26.
See West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).
Moreover, defendant cites no Utah authority requiring the State to prove an accomplice's
specific knowledge that the principal will use a weapon. Br. of Aplt. at 24. Indeed, there
appears to be no such requirement.
In State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court upheld
Smith's aggravated robbery conviction on a theory of accomplice liability. Although this
precise issue was not raised in Smith, the Supreme Court set forth the elements that had to
be established and articulated no separate requirement that Smith, the driver of the get
away car, had to have specific knowledge that weapons would be used. Id. at 1056.
Rather, in order to convict Smith as an accomplice to the aggravated robbery in that case,
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the State was required to prove only that "a deadly weapon, firearm, or facsimile of a
firearm was used in the commission of the crime." Id.
In the present case, the jury similarly had to conclude that defendant had the
mental state required to commit a criminal offense and that she solicited, requested,
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided her knife-wielding cohort. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995). The evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
support the jury's verdict. Defendant admired Ms. Brown's shoes and consequently
commanded one her two cohorts to "get" them for her (R. 314). Defendant's cohort
immediately pulled an 18" inch from behind his back and demanded the shoes on
defendant's behalf (R. 315).
Admittedly, defendant did not expressly ask defendant to use the knife, or
otherwise comment on its appearance. Nevertheless, the jury could reasonably conclude
that defendant directed her cohort to get the shoes precisely because she knew that he, as
opposed to her other male companion, had a weapon that could be used to effectuate her
command. It is a further reasonable inference that if defendant had been surprised and/or
alarmed by the knife's appearance, she would have demonstrated that surprise in some
fashion, or attempted to prevent her cohort from threatening Ms. Brown with the knife.
The record is devoid of any indication that she did so. Instead, defendant watched as her
armed cohort chased Ms. Brown to her apartment.
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Because defendant ignores the above reasonable inferences, she has failed
to comply with the marshalling requirement, and this Court should not consider her
sufficiency challenge. State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App. 1994).
Additionally, there is some evidence that defendant solicited the aggravated robbery with
the mental state to commit an offense. As long as there is evidence, including these
reasonable inferences, from which all of the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, the Court should affirm the jury verdict. State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70,
87 (Utah 1993) ("[w]e will affirm the jury verdict as long as there is some evidence,
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made" (citation omitted)).
This is simply not a case where defendant had the misfortune to be present
while her cohort committed the aggravated robbery; indeed, defendant's command to
"get" the shoes instigated the crime. Compare State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah
1977) (holding that other officer-defendants not accomplice to defendant officer's
evidence tampering where jury found that officers merely followed their superior's orders
and did not know what he had planned); and State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1972)
(holding that two witnesses were not accomplices, and could therefore testify, where there
was no evidence that they assisted in or were present during the crime). The evidence is
not so inherently improbable that reasonable persons must have entertained a reasonable
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doubt about defendant's participation, or in particular, defendant's knowledge that the
knife would be and was used to get Ms. Brown's shoes.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court
affirm defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J_ day of August, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
IAN DECKER
(ssistant Attorney General
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, DIVISION I
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
v.
DIANE MARIE NELSON,

Case No. 961901374FS

Defendant.

JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS

The defendant, DIANE MARIE NELSON, by and through counsel, RICHARD P.
MAURO, moves the court to suppress statements of witnesses relating to
their identification of Ms. Nelson and to suppress their in court
identification of her.

This motion is based on the grounds that the

identification procedure was unreliable and unduly suggestive and taints
any other identification of Defendant, in violation of due process under
the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Neil v. Biqqers. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

This motion is made on the further

grounds that the unreliable and suggestive procedure violates Article I, §7
of the Utah Constitution.
DATED this ^"'

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).

day of August, 1996.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

RICHARD P
URO
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the District Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this £5 day of
August, 1996.
/^\

r
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Addendum B

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
ROGER BLAYLOCK, 0367
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

AUG 29 19S6
Otputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
v EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

-vsDIANE MARIE NELSON,
Defendant.

Case No. 961901374FS
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, E. Neal Gunnarson, District Attorney for
Salt Lake County, and Roger Blaylock, Deputy District Attorney, respectfully submits the
following memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Identification.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant moves this court to suppress evidence relating to the identification of her by the
State's witness ("witness"). Defendant grounds her motion on the assertion that the police
showup was impermissibly suggestive in violation of Defendant's state and federal due process
rights. Defendant wholly fails to support this bare assertion with any analysis.
The State respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant's Motion because the
police showup did not result in a very substantial likelihood that the witness misidentified the
Defendant. Therefore, the witness1 identification of Defendant at the showup is admissible.
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Moreover, the totality of the circumstances proves that the witness* personal observations of
Defendant provided a basis upon which to identify Defendant that is independent of the showup.
Hence, the witness should be permitted to identify the Defendant in court even if this Court
suppresses the showup.
FACTS
On July 1, 1996, at approximately 9:53 p.m., Salt Lake City Police Officers Boelter and
Degraw were dispatched to the area of 300 South and 300 West in Salt Lake City to investigate a
report of a suspicious person. When they arrived, the witness explained that as she was walking
toward her apartment, a black female ("Defendant") accosted her and said, "Give me your shoes."
The victim refused to surrender her shoes and continued walking. Defendant then ordered one of
her two white male companions to take the witness' shoes. The witness observed one of the
males pull a fixed blade hunting style knife from behind his back and hold it toward the witness.
While threatening the witness with the knife, the male said, "Give her your shoes." The witness
ranfromthe scene and the male chased her a short distance before running away. The witness
thought she observed all three suspects leave the scene headed westbound on 300 South. Based
on the witness1 observation and interaction with Defendant, she was able to describe Defendant to
police as a black female approximately 5*6" tall, with short, curly black hair.
While the witness was giving the above information to Officer Degraw, Officer Boelter
observed Defendant in an alley no more thanfiftyfeet east of the scene. Officer Boelter contacted
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officer Degraw and together they approached Defendant as she exited the alley. Officer Degraw
noted that Defendant matched the description given by the witness, so he took Defendant to the
witness for a showup. The witness positively identified Defendant as the woman who had
demanded her shoes only minutes earlier.
ARGUMENT
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE

The Due Process clauses of both the Utah and Federal constitutions prohibit the use of
unreliable eyewitness identification evidence to obtain a conviction. State v. Perry, 899 P.2d
1232, 1236 (Utah App. 1° 5); Neil v. Biggers, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382 (1972). However, the Utah
Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution as requiring a more demanding analysis than
the federal constitution for determining whether an eyewitness identification is reliable. State v.
Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986). This is because the Utah Supreme Court, in its own view,
places more stock in scientific studies that lead inexorably to the conclusion that human
perception is inexact and that human memory is limited and fragile. Id at 488. To prohibit
identification of an accused based solely upon the faulty recollection of an eyewitness—and
thereby risk a conviction that violates an accused due process under article I, section 7 of the
Utah Constitution-Utah courts must conduct an in-depth appraisal of the reliability of eyewitness
identification testimony before admitting such evidence. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780
(Utah 1991).
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In Ramirez, the Court laid out five factors a judge must consider when determining
whether eyewitness identification is reliable:
(1) [T]the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the
event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the event,
including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the
witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion;
and (5) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood
that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly
This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was
observed, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the
observer's *
Ramirez, at 781 (citations omitted). If the judge finds the identification reliable in light of these
five factors, then the identification evidence is admissible under both the state and federal
constitutions. Id. at 784 ("[0]ur article I, section 7 analysis is certainly as stringent as, if not more
stringent than, the federal analysis [therefore] we see no need to perform a separate Biggers
federal analysis.")
In some cases, however, the judge may suspect that the witness' identification of the
defendant is unreliable under factor (4) of the Ramirez analysis because the state conducted a

1

The United States Supreme Court's reliability factors focus significantly less on the witness* ability to perceive
the event and accurately recall it:
[Tjhe opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,
the witness* degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness* prior description
of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
Neil v. Biggers, 93 S.Ct 375, 382 (1972).
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lineup, showup, or photo array in a manner suggesting the witness should select defendant. When
the defendant alleges the state has employed such suggestive procedures, the court must
determine if the procedures "giveriseto a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification." State v. Thamer, 111 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989). If the court so holds, the
appropriate remedy is to suppress evidence relating to that identification. Simmons v. United
States, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971 (1968). However, the witness may still make an in court identification
of the defendant if, under the totality of the circumstances, the witness' own experience with the
defendant provides a reliable basis for identifying the defendant that is independent of the
suggestive state procedure. State v. Gurule, 856 P.2d 377, 380 (Utah App. 1993); Thamer, 111
P.2d at 435 (Utah 1989)(holding that if out of court identification procedure is impermissibly
suggestive, then in court identification must based on untainted, independent foundation). The
State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that its witness' own
experience with the defendant provides a reliable independent basis for the in court identification.
Gurule, at 381.
B.

THE WITNESS' IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT
AT THE SHOWUP WAS RELIABLE.

As discussed in section A, above, this Court should suppress the witness' identification of
Defendant at the showup only if itfindsthat identification to be unreliable. But under the fivefactored Ramirez analysis, the witness1 identification of Defendant at the showup was wholly
reliable. Each of these factors will discussed independently below.
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L The Witness' Opportunity to View the Defendant During the Event.
The Ramirez court articulated a list of considerations to guide a judge's analysis of this
first factor. These include
the length of time the witness viewed the actor; the distance
between the witness and the actor; whether the witness could view
the actor's face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were
distracting noises or activity during the observation; and any other
circumstances affecting the witness's opportunity to observe the
actor.
Ramirez at 782.
The witness did not indicate how long she observed Defendant. However, the encounter
was of sufficient duration for Defendant to notice the witness' shoes, demand them, and order one
of her companions to seize them. The witness' report to police indicates the encounter took place
in fairly close quarters, presumably on the sidewalk as the witness walked within several feet of
Defendant. The short distance between the witness and Defendant permitted Defendant to
observe the shoes on the witness feet in sufficient detail to desire them. Moreover, if there was
adequate lighting for Defendant to perceive the witness' shoes in detail, then the witness could
likewise have notice the Defendant's physical characteristics. There is no evidence that there were
distracting noises or activity that interfered with the witness' observation of Defendant.
2. The Witness'Degree of Attention to Defendant
The witness was alone as she walked toward and past the Defendant. She was not
engaged in conversation or otherwise distracted by any companions. She was simply walking
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toward her apartment when she noticed Defendant and her two male accomplices. While the
witness may not ordinarily have paid much attention to the Defendant, Defendant initiated
conversation with the witness. Defendant compelled the witness* attention by making an
unequivocal demand for the witness' shoes. Although the witness did not respond to the demand,
the witness was focused on Defendant given the hostile nature of the exchange. Thus, the witness
had a high degree of attention to Defendant.
J. The Witness' Capacity to Observe Defendant During the Event
The Ramirez court offered the following considerations to guide the judge in
consideration of this factor:
Here, relevant circumstances include whether the witness's capacity
to observe was impaired by stress orfrightat the time of the
observation, by personal motivations, biases, or prejudices, by
uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol.
Id. at 783 (citations omitted).
The witness may well have been frightened by Defendant's demand for her shoes. Her
fright would undoubtedly have increased when one of the male accomplices pulled a knife and
repeated the demand. However, the witness' fear did not disable her or otherwise inhibit the
normal operation of her senses. When the knife-wielding accomplice approached her, the witness
ran to her apartment and called the police. Thus, even though the witness was probably very
frightened by the episode, her senses were functioning well enough to allow her to run to her

0000

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
IDENTIFICATION
Case No. 961901374FS
Page 8

apartment and communicate her distress to the police. If her hearing or vision were substantially
disabled by fear, she could not have performed her escape and plea for help.
Finally, there is no evidence that the witness1 perception of Defendant that night was
impaired by personal motivation, biases, prejudices, uncorrected visual defects, fatigue, injury,
drugs or alcohol.
4. Spontaneity and Consistency of Witness9 Identification and
Whether it was the Product of Suggestion.
The relevant Ramirez considerations of this factor include the
length of time of the event and the identification of the defendant;
the witness's mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the
identification; the witness's exposure to opinions, description,
identifications, or other information from other sources; instances
when the witness or other eyewitness to the event failed to identify
defendant; instances when the witness or other eyewitness gave a
description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness
for identification.
Ramirez at 783.
With respect to the timing of the descriptions given by the witness, her initial description
was given to the responding officers only minutes after the incident. Thus, the elapsed time was
minimal. Between the incident and the description, the witness did not see or hear anyone else
describe Defendant. Her description to police was spontaneous and based wholly on her own
recollection.
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The witness' description was consistent with the Defendant's appearance. When
the police noticed Defendant in an alley no more thanfiftyfeet from the scene, they brought her
for a showup . Officer Degraw's police report specifically states he brought Defendant for a
showup because she "fit what description the victim was able to give me." Thus, Officer Degraw
recognized that the witness' description of Defendant was entirely consistent with Defendant's
actual appearance. Aside from any agitation the witness may have felt from seeing Defendant in
person at the showup, there is no evidence to indicate the witness' mental capacity and state of
mind influenced her identification.
5. The Nature of the Event the Witness Perceived and the Likelihood
She Would Perceive. Remember, and Relate it Correctly.
The witness was a victim of an attempted armed robbery. Such events are highly unusual
and would likely draw the undivided attention of any innocent victim. But the actions and actors
involved in this armed robbery were not so unusual as to place them outside human perception.
Defendant and her accomplices stood within the plain view of the witness as she walked by.
Defendant was not racing by in a speeding automobile. Moreover, Defendant voiced her demand
in plain English: "Give me your shoes." The witness could not mistake the threatening tone of the
demand. The danger of the situation was dramatically underscored when the male accomplice
pulled a knife and repeated the demand. In short, the encounter was clearly dangerous and would
have left a vivid imprint in the witness' recollection. While it is true that Defendant and the
witness are of different races, the witness' description of Defendant did not rely upon an ability to
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perceive the subtle nuances of Defendant's unique physical characteristics Instead, the witness
described in more general terms the Defendant's race, height, and color and length of hair In light
of the unusual circumstances of the encounter between Defendant and the witness, it is highly
probable that the witness could accurately remember and relate that encounter correctly
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CONCLUSION
The witness' identification of Defendant at the showup bears all the indicia of reliability
required under thefive-factoredRamirez analysis. The witness observed Defendant from only a
few feet away under highly unusual circumstances. She suffered no distractions or impairments
that would preclude her ability to perceive Defendant. Furthermore, the showup was conducted
with complete impartiality. Defendant was chosen for the showup because she was no more than
fifty feet from the crime scene and she perfectly matched the witness' description. There is no
evidence the showup was "suggestive" and Defendant wholly fails to make that argument. Thus,
the witness' identification is reliable and the State urges the Court to admit evidence of the
showup identification.
But even if the Courtfindsthe showup procedure in some way suggestive, the totality of
the circumstances makes clear that witness has an independent basis upon which to make an incourt identification of Defendant. Therefore, the witness should be allowed to make an in-court
identification of Defendant even if the showup identification is suppressed.

2<rfL

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ££f day of August, 1996
E NEAL/GUNNARSON
District Attorney

GERBLAYLOCK
eputy District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum In Opposition
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; OCTOBER 9, 1996; A.M . SESSION
THE COURT:

You may be seated.

We're here in

the matter of State versus Diane Marie Nel son, it's
961901374.

This is in connection with the motion to

suppress i dentification of the eye witness , and
concerning bond, as I understand it.

Mr. Mauro, you're

here on be half of the defendant, Mr. Blayl ock's here for
the state.

You may proceed.
MR. MAURO:

Yes, Your Honor.

In talking to

Mr. Blaylock, I believe there's a bit of a problem.

I

had filed a notice of intent to :rely on ex pert
testimony, and I filed that in a timely manner, and I
included Dr. Dodd, who's present here, I included his
curriculum vitae.
I had intended to meet with Dr. Dodd and have
him put to gether a report sometime around the end of
September.

I have, through my f<ault, not had an

opportunity to do that, or meet with him today.

I have

provided to Mr. Blaylock a different repor t of the areas
that I bel ieve that Dr. Dodd has testified about, but he
has not, in conformance with the statute, prepared a
report that relates specifically to this case.
I think, in terms of t h e — i f I understand
Mr. Blaylo ck correctly, and he can correct me if I'm
wrong—he was going to be submitting the p reliminary

<•(<.: u
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hearing transcript as part of their isasis to argue under
Ramirez that this was not a suggestive show-up
procedure.
We were go ing to take parts of the transcript
and have Dr. Dodd tes tify about the different factors
that would impact or go into the eye witness
identification procedure, and then ask him some
questions about the reliability of that procedure under
the facts and circumstances of this case.
So that's kind of where we're at.

I don't

believe Mr. Blaylock' s going to be presenting any other
evidence.

He indicat ed that he, based upon the report,

he may want to hire an expert of his own, and contradict
some of the things.

But that is- -

THE COURT:
that.

And I think he's entitled to do

And as far as I'm concerned, I think Mr. Dodd is

probably entitled to give an opinion.

I suspect that

those things he'll be attesting to are the same things
that are covered in the Long instruction.
MR. MAUR0:

They are.

THE COURT:

And frankly, I'll be honest with

you Mr. Mauro, unless there's something highly unusual,
here, it's an issue o f fact as to whether or not the eye
witness ID is reliabl e.

Dr. Dodd can certainly say what

he thinks, but he's not the finder of fact, the jury

^ 00162
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would be.
So what I'd be inclined to do is let it go to
the jury, and not suppress the identification, give the
Long instruction, let Dr. Dodd testify, let the state
call an expert if they wish to.
But I'm happy to hear testimony today if you
want to put it on.

What I'd suggest you may want to do

is make a proffer, and I suspect Mr. Blaylock may accept
it and the court may accept it.
MR. MAURO:

Okay.

I think I could probably

THE COURT:

Mr. Blaylock, do you have any

do that.

objection to p roceeding in that manner?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Your Honor, the concern that I

have, and the concern that I expressed to counsel, was
that because I did not have a copy of a report from
Dr. Dodd that related specifically to this case, the
facts of this case, that he would be relying on, the
circumstances, it makes it very difficult for me to
address those specific issues and to know what,
basically, we wanted to present in this kind of a
hearing.
So I indicated to Mr. Mauro that I thought
that we were m laybe a little premature on that, having
the hearing now, putting on testimony now, since I

000163
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haven't had that opportunity.
The second thing was that, as an
accommodation- THE COURT:

But my question was, do you

oppose proceeding in the manner I indicated?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

I think it would- -

Well,

putting on testimony now puts me at a disadvantage,
because I don't know what Dr. Dodd's going to say with
regards to this specific- THE COURT:
Mr. Blaylock.

I don't think you heard me,

I didn't talk about testimony, I talked

about a proffer.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Well, the court said first

testimony, and indicated that counsel may desire to
shorten that by making a proffer of what that testimony
would be.
THE COURT:

Are you going to put on the

witness or offer a proffer, Mr. Mauro?
MR. MAURO:

It may be, and I'm thinking about

that as I'm standing here.

It may be more appropriate

to put Dr. Dodd on briefly, only because I think he can
better explain the—and I don't know if they're
necessarily scientific issues--but there are certainly
issues that relate to State versus Long and State versus
Ramirez.

0 0 01 0 4
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THE COURT:

I think they're accepted.

I

understand why you would need to put him on for a jury,
or why you believe you would.

But I'm willing to give a

Long instruction, I've heard this sort of thing before,
I'm aware that eye witness testimony can be incorrect,
and there are many factors that contribute to how
reliable it is.
Let me ask this, Mr. Blaylock.

Did you get

his notice on September 24th?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

I got a notice of his intent

to rely on this witness as an expert, yes.

Now, my

understanding of the statute is that it requires also
that, in addition to that, a report be submitted to
counsel so counsel knows what the substance of that
testimony would be, and basically what amounts to a
proffer of what that witness will be testifying to.
THE COURT:
deny it.

If that's your only objection, I

Because frankly, it's very clear what his

testimony would be from the notice itself.

So the

defense intends to call Dr. David H. Dodd from the
University of Utah Department of Psychology to present
testimony relative to eye witness testimony.

That's

basically what he'd be saying, Mr. Mauro; is that
correct?
MR. MAURO:

That's correct, Your Honor.

0 0 016 5
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THE COURT:

If it went beyond that, I'd
But it's clear that's what

understand your objection.
he'd be attest.Lng to.
Mr. Blaylock.

You didn 't file an objection,

If you want addi tional time we can set it

over, I suppose.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

That' s not what I'm saying,

What I'm saying is that testimony varies

Your Honor.

with each specific case because there are different
circumstances .in each case.
THE COURT:

Are you asking for more time,

Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

I wou Id just like to see a

reoort from Mr . Dodd# Dr. Dodd.
THE COURT:

Has he p repared a report?

MR. MAURO:

He can p repare a report.

I've

met with himf unfortunately today's the first time I met
with him.

I think Dr. Dodd could prepare a report in- -

How quickly?
DR. DODD:
THE COURT:

A day.
I don't think you're entitled to

a report unless one exists, Mr. Blaylock.

What you're

entitled to is to know what the witness would attest to.
If you want to have him put on the stand today, and
that's what I'm trying to find out, we can do that,
giving you leave to have him re -called at a later time.

0 0010 6 1
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Or you can wait, if Mr. Mauro is acquiescing in your
request for a report.

What are you asking to do?

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Well, whether or not I cross

examine him depends upon what information is provided.
If counsel makes a proffer- -

What I'm saying is, I

know generally what he's going to testify to.

In this

case specifically I don't know what he would say.

I

don't know what he would say with regards to how tainted
some eye witness identification may be because of
contacts, and that's- THE COURT:

That's the purpose of cross

examination and examination.

So again, my question is,

do you want him put on the stand today, or do you want
additional time?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Well, and again, this isn't my

motion, it's counsel's motion.

If he feels it's

necessary for him to make the case that he wants to, I
guess now is the time, and he has the witness here, and
rather than waste the time he could put him on.
THE COURT:

This court, since there is no

objection based upon timeliness, is going to allow
Dr. Dodd to testify at the time of trial.

Assuming

foundation can be laid consistent with the curriculum
vitae, I would allow the witness to be called at trial
to testify to the general unreliability, or the factors

0 0 0167
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that lead to unreliability in eye witness testimony.
Given my ruling, I don't think you can gain
anything by putting him on, Mr. Mauro.

I guess

Mr. Blaylock has the option of calling him if he wishes
to.
MR. MAURO:

That's fine, Your Honor.

I just

wanted to indicate, just so that you're aware, what I
had Dr. Dodd do was review the preliminary hearing
transcript.

He could testify about, and I think as this

court is aware, there are three stages of eye witness
identification analysis:

The acquisition, the

retention, and the retrieval.
And perhaps you're right.

I mean, when I

read Ramirez, we certainly run into the problem of
whether that goes to the weight or whether that goes to
the various issues that- -

Whether it goes to weight or

whether the court, on the front end, can make some kind
of legal analysis about the reliability.

That is what

we had intended to do, and that was the purpose of the
motion.
I think you are correct, however, that
Dr. Dodd is essentially going to describe the factors in
Long, describe the factors in Ramirez, and talk about
how those apply to the individual specifics of this
case.

He will express concern about the darkness, the
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shortness of the period of time, and the observation,
the cross-cultural issue, and he will express concern
about the identification that occurred in this case,
which, as I'm sure the court is aware, a show-up
procedure, where she was handcuffed in front of a patrol
car.
THE COURT:

Right.

And again, either side

can argue this with or without testimony.

But absent

any further information that persuades me, I'm inclined
to allow the identification to stand, to deny the motion
to suppress, but to instruct the jury fully on the issue
of eye witness identification pursuant to Long, to allow
the state to call a witness on eye witness
identification of their own if they wish to.

That

witness would need to be designated fairly quickly,
because the trial is set for November 4th.

How much

time do you need, Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

I need some time to talk to

Dr. Dodd and see specifically what he's going to say
with regards to the facts of this case.
least- -

I would need at

We're set on the 4th of November, aren't we?

If I could have ten days.
THE COURT:
at the 18th.

Ten days from today would put it

That's the day of the pretrial.

it until the 17th at 5:00 o'clock.

I'll make

That way your expert

0 0 016 9
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needs to be identified by the time we have our pretrial.
If there's an offer to be made, it needs to be made by
that time.

Is there anything furtherf Mr. Mauro?
MR. MAURO:

No.

And certainly Dr. Dodd is

available today to talk to Mr. Blaylock.
THE COURT:

So noted.

He's seated in the

courtroom and able to be interviewed.

If he does

generate a report--and I understand he's going
to—Mr. Bl aylock is en titled to that within twenty-four
hours of y our getting it, Mr. Mauro.
MR. MAURO:

And I will send that to him.

THE COURT:

All right, any other issues?

MR. MAURO:

The only other issue was the bond

issue, and I can update the court.

The last time that

we were here we talked about Diane's entry into a
program.

And I had discussed with the court the

Salvation Army program , and I understand, and I don't
know much about the women's Salvation Army program,
other than it's brand new.

She is on the waiting list,

I think sh e's number 1 or number 2 on the waiting list
at this po int.
I don't have much information to give the
court about what they do, or what kind of treatment
facilities they have there.

I'm sure it's similar to

the men's program.

0 0 01 7 0
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THE COURT:

Let me ask you what her record

MR. MAURO:

Judge, I represent Ms. Nelson on

is.

a drug case.

on- -

THE COURT:

Another pending case?

MR. MAURO:

No, no.

It's a case that she's

She may be on probation right now.
THE COURT:

To whom?

J

MR. MAURO:

It's a judge in the circuit

court, or Division II •
THE COURT:

1

Do you know who it is?

THE DEFENDANT:

A Dever.

THE COURT:

And what is the charge?

MR. MAURO:

A class A misdemeanor.

THE COURT:

Reduced from a third?

MR. MAURO:

Reduced from a third, I believe.

THE COURT:

Possession?

MR. MAURO:

I believe it is possession.

THE COURT:

And what drug?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Cocaine.

And when did that occur?

When

did they allege you possessed- THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

About a year ago.

And when were you put on

probation?
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COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

14

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

A year ago?

THE DEFENDANT:
MR. MAURO:

At that time.

About a year ago now.

It was about a year ago, Your

Honor, as I recall.
THE COURT:

So she was clearly on probation

when this alleged crime occurred; is that correct?
MR. MAURO:

She was.

THE COURT:

Are there any failures to appear

in her record, or any other crimes?
MR. MAURO:

Judge, there are some other

crimes, and I know most of them because we have been
through this with Judge Dever, are suostance abuse
related.

And I know I'd represented to the court on a

prior occasion, it's clear to me that Diane is very
bright and very knowledgeable but for her drug problem.
THE COURT:

Does she have other felony

convictions?
MR. MAURO:

I don't think she does.

I see on

her record that I have here that they look to be mostly
DUI, possession cases, things like that.

Paraphernalia

cases.
I know for a long period of time that she
owned her own business here in Salt Lake City, she has
two children that are now in the care of her husband, I
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believe.

She is divorced, her two children are thirteen

years old, they're both twins,

It's clear to me that

she played a significant role in the raising of those
children until she developed this drug problem.
She lost her business, she lost a lot of
other things in her life.

I think this is the longest

period of time that she has spent in jail.

It's been

somewhat of an eye-opener for her, she's h<ad an
opportunity to straighten out,, at least to the extent
that she's dried out from the use of drugs

She's not

been living on the street for a long perio<a of time, and
I think she's had a lot of time to think.
She's corresponded with me in 1<etters quite
frequently, and I think I see some insight into what her
problem is, and her situation r and why she 's here, and
the problems that's not only caused for he r, but the
problems it's causing for her children.
Her children are teenagers now, they have
lived without a mother for a significant p eriod of time.
Both because Ms. Nelson has made that choice, the wrong
choice, by not reuniting with her children because of
her drug problem, and now she gets a real opportunity to
think about the potential destruction she' s caused,
because she's not there to raise her child ren, and to be
with her children, in the significantly formative years
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of her life.
As I've ind icated, it's clear to me that, but
for the drug problem, she is very bright, very
intelligent, she's very aware of what's going on.

I

talked to her and have discussions with her about the
case that are quite insightful in terms of where she's
coming from.
THE COURT:

But why the Salvation Army

MR. MAURO:

That is the only program right

program?

now, the community-based program that doesn't require
payment.

I don't know what the- THE COURT:

What about Odyssey House?

MR. MAURO:

I don't know what the situation

with Odyssey House is.
THE COURT:

They don't require payment.

MR. MAURO:

That's right, and I don't know if

she's been interviewed by them or not.
THE COURT:

Are you willing to go into

Odyssey House, Ms. Nel son?
THE DEFENDANT:

The way I see it, Odyssey

House sets people up f or failure.
THE COURT:

The answer to that is no?

THE DEFENDANT:

That's not the answer.

I've

applied for Odyssey House, although I've been waiting
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since I've gone in jail the 1st of July, I've been
waiting for an answer back from them.

J

We don't have an

answer back from them.
THE COURT:

What do you mean, they set people

up for failure?
THE DEFENDANT:

There's a lot of people that

go to that program and run it.
THE COURT:

I understand- -

And you think the program creates

the problem?
THE DEFENDANT:

I think, but perhaps the

program might be part of the problem, yeah.
THE COURT:

J

You don't think maybe drug

addiction is the problem?
THE DEFENDANT:

Don't misunderstand me.

You

know, I'm aware of my issues, I'm aware what a lengthy
program would have to offer- THE COURT:

I've gotten your answer, but

thank you for that guidance.

Mr. Blaylock, what is your

position?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

The State's position is if she

wants to enter Odyssey House and be serious about it and
make an effort there, we have no objection to her being
released to Odyssey House.

That would make a difference

as to how we dispose of this case ultimately, also.
THE COURT:

Has she got any failures to
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appear, or any record other than what Mr. Mauro has
indicated?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Your Honor, the record that I

have—these are historically inaccurate as far as
reporting b a c k — I show eleven arrests, four convictions,
two of those convictions deal with controlled
substances.
theft.

There are additional arrests for retail

I don't show failures to appear, though.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Mauro, anything else

you'd like to say?
MR. MAURO:

Just that, Judge, I can't recall,

I don't believe we had failures to appear in the other
case, but I don't have an independent memory of that.
THE COURT:

I'll accept your representation.

My concern, Mr. Mauro, is that I think the Salvation
Army program is fine for some people who do not have
significant problems with substance abuse.

It is not a

great program, in my opinion, for people who have a
significant problem.

And I'm not willing to release her

to that program.
If she's serious about treatment and wants a
long-term program, I think, as Mr. Blaylock points out,
it may well impact the disposition of the case.

It

certainly would impact my willingness to let her out.
But given that she apparently has mixed feelings about
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i
that, I'm not.
MR. MAURO:

Okay, Your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT:

Did you have something else?

MR. MAURO:

No, Your Honor.

THE DEFENDANT:

I believe that you got me

I believe that I've been involved in drugs a

I

long time, it's going 1to take a lot longer than some

I

wrong

Salvation Army program
THE COURT:

.

That's my point.

THE DEFENDANT:

It's going to take the rest

of my life, and I have to live that day by day.
now my children are in Arizona.

Right

I wish to go into

treatment in Arizona, \spend whatever time I have to
here, as per the court , but I'd like to be in Arizona
with my kids a:fter- THE COURT:

That's not in the cards.

You

have a serious crimina 1 matter pending, Ms . Nelson.

And

until that is ]resolved , you will not be in Arizona.
It's as simple as that

And I'm not putting you out on

the s treet, that would set you up to fail.

And you're

not j ust going to buy <a ticket to Arizona and think this
is behind you.
My (concern, Ms. Nelson, is that I need to
prote ct the community, as well as consider what you
want.

And I am not sa tisfied that I can protect the
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community unless you're in a tough, long-term, serious
drug treatment program.
If that's not what you want—and that's
really not what you want , is what I'm hearing—then why
should we kid ourselves?

If you didn't do this crime,

that will come out at the trial, and then you're free to
do whatever you wish to.

If you did do it, then that

will also be determined, and then we'll look at what's
appropriate in terms of punishment.

But I'm not

comfortable with your be ing out unless you're in a
serious program.

denied.

Anythi ng further?

MR. MAURO:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Motion for reduction of bond is

We have a trial date, and as far as I can tell

that looks like a good one, and we'll consider it a
first place setting and a go.
For that reason I will hold you to the
deadlines that I've set on the other things.
anything further at this time?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Is there

Mr. Blaylock?

The only other thing that we

kind of need to get resolved between us is the
transcript.

As an accommodation between our office and

legal defenders' office, what we normally do is accept
their typed-up version.

I haven't had the opportunity,

or had the tape to compare the tape to that transcript.
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I anticipate d<Ding that.

Mr. Mauro said he'd make that

tape available to me today.
THE COURT:
that?

Mr. Mauro, can I ask you to do

How long do you need?
MR. MAURO:

My secretary is no longer at the

office, so I hope I can find the copy of the tape.

If

not, I'll have it copied and send it over to
Mr. Blaylock's office.
THE COURT:

She's left for the day, or she's

left permanent:Ly?
MR. MAURO:

Her husband got a good job in

California, un:fortunately for us, and she's gone to
California.
THE COURT:
do this?

All right.

Well, why don't you

Mr. ]Blaylock, is there someone at your office

who could transcribe it?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

It1's transcribed.

I just need

to listen to the tape and look at the transcription.
THE COURT:

So it1's getting the tape.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

If Mr. Mauro can't find the

tape, if he'll let me know then I'll get hold of the
people over at the Division I, and they can make me a
copy in a fair.Ly short time.
THE COURT:
that, Mr. Mauro.

Let's give you an a deadline on

Let's say, why don't we give you
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until- -

I'd like to expedite it.

Can you have it to

him by Friday, the 11th?
MR, MAURO:

Sure.

I called my secretary, if

she has the tape I'll send it over to him this
afternoon.
THE COURT:

Okay, great.

Anything else we

need to cover today?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

I don't believe so.

MR. MAURO:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you, gentlemen.

That'll

take care of this one, then.
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not form an opinion, continue to keep an open mind,
don't allow anyone to discuss it with you or in your
presence.
I'm going to ask you to remain on this floor,
and Mr. Hellewell will show you out.
(The jury left the courtroom)
THE COURT:

All right, counsel, let me

indicate we're still in court, and I think we can handle
this rather quickly.

Let me hand each side a copy of

the court's stocks.

Let me tell you that I have then

taken your instructions and integrated them in, and I'm
going to discuss with you how I've done that, and then
you should be able to merge your instructions with what
I've got.
Most of what has been offered by the defense
is stock.

Let me go through.

The court's first eleven,

twelve instructions are all stock instructions.

The

twelfth instruction is offered in two different ways.
One, if the defendant takes the stand, one if the
defendant does not.

Both of them need to reflect female

pronouns, et cetera, and that can be done.
But let me ask you, your plan, Mr. Mauro, is
not to have the defendant take the stand?
MR. MAURO:

I don't believe so.

I haven't

talked about that with her, but- -
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THE COURT:

Why idon't you do that now?

MR. MAURO:

Judg e, Ms. Nelson is not going to

I

take the witness stand •
THE COURT:

All right, and you've explained

to her her right to take th e stand if she chooses to do
so, the :fact that no one wi 11 comment on it or draw any
negative inferences from it if she does not testify.
But she 1understands sh<B has both the right to testify
and tell her story, or the right not to; is that
correct?
MR. MAURO:

That 's correct.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. MAURO:

And for the record, I have spoken

to her a couple of times, most recently of which was
last night at the jail , and spent a couple of hours down
there ta Lking to her.
THE COURT:

All right.

So we will utilize

the long*er instruction that 's numbered 12 in your
packets, which is the <Dne where if she chooses not to
testify.

And I'll make the changes to make it gender

specific for the defendant.
Next instruction that you should put in place
is one that's at the back o f my packet that I'm moving
forward, it's the one, it's unnumbered, it begins, "The
defendant in this action is a member of the blank race."
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I'm going to change that so it reads, "The
defendant in this action is African American," and it
goes on to say, "The fact of the defendant's race should
not be construed to her detriment or in her favor."
On the last two lines it talks about creed or
color, and that's changed so it will read, "regardless
of race, religion, ethnicity and gender, comma, is
entitled to the same protection under the law."

I'm

assuming there's no objection to that being given.

It

appears appropriate.
MR. BLAYLOCK:
THE COURT:
reasonable doubt.

No, Judge.

The next one is 13, which is

I'm giving that instead of

Mr. Mauro's requested reasonable doubt instruction.
The next one is one that was submitted by the
state, it was their number 5 in the packet.

It begins

"To constitute the crime charged in the information,
there must be the joint operation of two essential
elements."

doubt.

Any objection to that?
MR. MAURO:

Is that next in the- -

THE COURT:

I'll put that in after reasonable

It was the plaintiff's number 5 in terms of the

order of their instructions.

We'll make you a set of

these.
MR. MAURO:

Okay.
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THE COURT:

Any objection to th at?

It

defines conduct, act, omission, talks about mens rea,
really.
MR. MAURO:

I think I may have had an

objection to that, but let me look and see .

1

It's 5 in

their packet?
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

Theirs are unnumbered,

but if you count down I think it was five.

"To

constitute the crime charged."
MR. MAURO:

I think that's fine

sure they're all applicable.

I'm not

I'm not sure omission is

applicable.
THE COURT:

He can delete it.

MR. MAURO:

Sure.

Do you want it

deleted?
I just don't think it

relates to this case.
THE COURT:

On the other hand, I suppose one

could argue that if a man was giving chase with a knife,
she, in failing to stop him, engaged in omissive type
conduct, if you will.

Mr. Blaylock, was that your

theory in defining that, as well?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
THE COURT:

That was one of the theories.

I'm going to .Leave it as it is,

because there .is an instruction here that says "If you
find a certain set of circumstances not to apply,
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disregard it."
The next one is from the state's packet, it
was number 7 in order, and it begins, "Every person
acting with the mental state required for the commission
of the offense, who di:rectly commits the act, who
solicits, requests, commands, et cetera."

I think we

need that one, it's your aiding and abetting language.
MR. MAURO:
had given me?

Those were in the packet that you

Maybe I 'm just- -

THE COURT:

I don't think I gave it to you.

MR. MAURO:

You're going through his packet

THE COURT:

I'm integrating his into mine.

MR. MAURO:

I understand now.

THE COURT:

So what was his number 7 falls

now.

into place at this poi]nt in ours.

And it'll be

renumbered, and it beg ins, "Every person acting with the
mental state required. '• It's basically a stock for
aiding and abetting.
The next one was also the state's that we
integrate here, and it begins, "Although there is more
than one person who is involved in this incident, the
case against each person is separate and independent
from the case of the other.11

It seems appropriate and

I'm inclined to give it.
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MR. MAURO:

The only- -

this last week in our homicide case,

And I talked about
The only part of

that that I'm concerned about is the last sentence.
THE COURT:

j

"You are not to concern

yourselves; with the status of any other person or
defendant involved in this incident,•
MR. MAURO:

i

Because I think, to some extent,

they have to concern themselves with the conduct of the
other peop)le.

There is an argument to be made- -

THE COURT:

Well, how about with- -

Let's

MR. MAURO:

Why not just delete the last

see.

sentence?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
that clearly defines it.

It says "status."

I think

It's not the actions of the

defendant.
THE COURT:
parentheses- -

I'm going to put in

I'm g oing to add up at the beginning of

that last sentence, " You may consider the actions of the
other person, however , you are not to concern yourselves
with the status of any other person vis-a-vis whether
they've been charged, how they've been sentenced, et
cetera."

We'll retyp e it.

I think that's a good point,

Mr. Mauro.
Does that satisfy your concern on that?
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MR. MAURO:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

The next one is from

the plaintiff's packet, or the state's packet, it was
their number 10, it says, "Under the law of the state of
Utah, robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of
personal property."

Don't you need an attempt in there,

Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
that.

I do, and I just realized

That's not an accurate statement of the law.

attempted taking is what it should be.

Or

The intentional

taking or attempted taking of personal property.
THE COURT:

Well, is a robbery- -

robbery requires the taking.

I think a

An aggravated robbery can

include an attempt robbery.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Well, Your Honor, the statute

that was amended in 1995- THE COURT:

To encompass- -

an attempted robbery any more?

So we don't have

Robbery is a taking or

an attempted taking?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
legal fiction.

Attempted robbery is now a

What it now says is,

lf

A person commits

robbery if the person unlawfully and intentionally takes
or attempts to take personal property in the possession
of another.11

That's the present language.

THE COURT:

All right.

So we would insert
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"intentional taking or attempted taking of personal
property in the possession of another."

And then you

need to add that down below, don't you?

"In the course

of committing robbery or attempted robbery."

Do you

want to add it down there?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Maybe I'm looking at a

different instruction.
THE COURT:

No, we're on the same

instruction, it's number 10.
sentences.

It has two different

What I'm saying, it seems to me, to be

cautious you'd want to add "or attempted robbery" in the
second sentence, as well.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

That defines aggravated

robbery.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Aggravated robbery is in the

course of committing robbery, and robbery is an attempt.
THE COURT:

To be on the safe side, you may
1

want to say "or attempted robbery."
MR. BLAYLOCK:

That would be fine if the

court wants to add that.
THE COURT:

Do you have any objection to

that, Mr. Mauro?
MR. MAURO:

I don't believe I do.

just maybe take a quick look at the statute.

If I could
Put it in
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for now, and then I can raise it- -

I guess you want to

have it typed now, though.
THE COURT:

I'm going to have it typed, but

I'm relatively certain this is the law.

So you're

welcome to look.
Let's go over these, and then you can take a
look at it.

The next one in the order is the elements

instruction that was offered by the state.

I think it's

11 in terms of the order of what they offered.

It

begins, "Before you can convict the defendant, Diane
Marie Nelson, of the offense of aggravated robbery."

Do

you have any problem with this one?
MR. BLAYL0CK:
THE COURT:
"attempt" in it.

Your Honor, I did- -

I substituted the one that has

Is that what you mean?

MR. BLAYLOCK:

No, I submitted two other

ones, one of them being a lesser included offense.

If

they find it was not with a dangerous weapon- THE COURT:

I didn't see that.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

I submitted those to her

just- THE COURT:
includeds, were they?
attempt language.

Well, but they were not lesser
They were just- -

They had the

Which is not a lesser any more.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Robbery would be a lesser
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included o f an aggravated robbery.
THE COURT:

You're asking for a simple

robbery?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
THE COURT:

Yes.

We haven't gotten t o that yet,

have we?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

But this is the instruction

that would be effective.

Because at the e nd it says,

"If you do not find all of the elements of aggravated
robbery- - ti
THE COURT:

That's what I said.

I've got

your subst ituted one here.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

It says, "If you do not find

all the elements, then you must consider the question of
robbery."
THE COURT:

What it says is, it begins with,

"Before you can convict the defendant of a ggravated
robbery," that'rs the opening paragraph.

The last

paragraph is, "If, on the other hand, you are not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
consider the guilt or innocence of the defendant with
respect to robbery, a lesser included."
MR. BLAYLOCK:
THE COURT:
anticipati ng.

Exactly, I apolo gize.

That's all right, y ou were

That's the substituted one from the
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state.

And then there are elements for that, as well.
"Before you can convict the defendant, Diane

Marie Nelson, <of the offense of robbery, a lesser

|

included,11 so 4 that would go in, and these are the two
new ones that <came in today.
Then the next one begins, is definitional,
and it begins, "'Unlawful' means that which is contrary
to law, or unauthorized by law."
Mr. Mauro?

Any objection to that,

It was their 12.
MR. MAURO:

No.

I mean I don't know if we

need it, but I guess I don't object to it.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I think we need it to

define "unlawfiul. "
The next one was their 13, and it is
definitional.

It begins, "'Dangerous weapon' means any

item capable o f causing death or serious bodily injury,
or a facsimile or representation of the item."
objection to that?

It also defines attempt.

Any
It's a

one-page instruction.
MR. MAURO:

j
No.

Do we need serious bodily

injury in there?
THE COURT:

Perhaps not, but if they don't

find it exists , they don't need to consider it.
MR. MAURO:

That's fine.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

What that refers to is what
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the dangerous weapon is capable of doing.

Causing death

or serious bodily injury.
THE COURT:

Okay.

The next one is one of the

court's stocks, again, it's from kind of the back of the
packet, but we'd insert it here, I propose.

It begins,

"The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting."

I think the

state asked for one like this, or the defense did, as
well.

Any problem with that one?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
MR. MAURO:

The state has no objection.

I'd like to check, but I don't

think I have a legal basis to do that, so 3 will hold my
objection.
THE COURT:

All right.

And the next one is

one that the state offered as their number 2, it begins,
"Intent and motive should never be confused.

Motive is

what prompts a person to act or fail to act, intent
refers to the state of mind with which an act is done or
omitted."

Any objection to that?
MR. MAURO:

No.

THE COURT:

All right.

Then I would suggest

we insert the defendant's requested Long instruction,
which is three and a quarter pages long.

I have done a

shorter version of it, but I'm not going to offer mine.
I'll go ahead and read this in its entirety if, even if
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there's an objection.

Unless the state wants to offr er a

substitute, and I don1 t think you have that, do you?•
MR. BLAYLOCK:

Well, I have a substitute,

but- THE COURT:

Do you have any problem with the

defense offered Long instruction?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
it.

No, other than the length of

No •
THE COURT:

I'm going to give it.

And the

next one is the defense-requested one, "You cannot
convict the defendant on mere possibility, surmises or
speculations, however strong they may be."
with th:Ls?

Any problem

It is their number 9.
The last line is, "Where there are two

possible explanations for the conduct of the defendant
by one explanation, the defendant would not be
responsible."

you, Mr • Mauro?

You're really not entitled to this, are
Because your theory of the case is not

that she was behaving appropriately.

Your theory of» the

case is it wasn't her.
MR. MAURO:
the case.

That is certainly the theory of

What we did discuss in opening, however, is

certainly if there was, indeed, a woman there, her
conduct wasn't rising to the level.

And I think thesre's

a valid argument to maike, that she's merely present at
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the scene, possibly,
THE COURT:

Well, you can argue that, but it

seems to me that there are not two possible explanations
for the conduct of the defendant under your theory of
the case.
MR. MAURO:

No, I think you're correct.

Our

primary argument is the identification procedures.
THE COURT:

Do you object to this,

Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:
THE COURT:
it.

For those reasons, yes.

All right, I'm not going to give

I had considered giving it, but I'm not going to.
The defendant also did not take the stand, or

as I understand it, is not taking the stand to offer an
alternative theory of what occurred, so for that reason
also it's inappropriate.

Unless something changes.

The next one is the defense offered, it
begins, "In determining whether an accused is criminally
responsible for an act committed by another, the degree
of his responsibility is determined by his own mental
state."

Any problem with this, Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

No.

I believe that, however,

is reflected in the state's already given parties
instruction.

It says, "Everyone acting with the mental

state required by law."

I think this is superfluous.
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THE COURT:

Are you satisfied with the other

MR. MAURO:

The reason I submitted this, I

one?

submitted this out of a trial I had, it's right out of
State versus Krick.
THE COURT;

I'm inclined to give it if you

MR. MAURO:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Okay, the next one is voluntary

want it.

intoxication.

You haven't raised that.

not going to.

The state offered it.

I assume you're

I'll pull it out.

It's not appropriate under these facts.
Next one is the court's stock, "In arriving
at a verdict in this case you shall not discuss nor
consider the subject of penalty or punishment."
The next one is, "If, in these instructions,
any ]rule, direction or idea has been stated in varying

ways .ff

The next one is, "The court has endeavored to

give you instructions embodying all rules of law that
may become necessary in guiding you."
The next one is, "The state of Utah and the
defendant both are entitled the individual opinion of
each juror."
And last one is, or excuse me, next to last,
tt T h e

attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of
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their deliberations are a matter of considerable
importance."
And finally , "When you retire to consider
your verdict.11

J

But th is does not have the lesser

included in it , and I guess needs to have it.

Are you

opposing the g iving of a lesser included?
MR. MAURO:
Because they- «

Well, you know, I think I would.

I mean they believe that she should be

charged with the aggravated robbery.
charged.

That's what's been

I do]n't know what the basis for the lesser

included is.
THE COURT:

If they find the weapon was not

utilized, or not utilized by her, I suppose.
MR. MAURO:

I

And under Baker and the other

cases, there's certain ly a different standard for the
state to offer a lesser included.

And the reason being,

obviously, is •they hav e the screening process that they
go through, and they h ave the other things that they do.
I wouldn't object if they were to amend it down to a
second-degree felony a nd it went to the jury as a
second-degree felony.
THE COURT:

Well, that's good of you,

MR. MAURO:

I would object, however, to the

Mr. Mauro.

lesser included being submitted.

I don't believe that
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they have a basis for doing that.
THE COURT:

It seems to me that under the

testimony, and what I understand the remaining testimony
to be, we've either got a, "She didn't do it, somebody
else did,1* or we've got, "She did it."

But it's not a

"she committed robbery," because if they find the
witnesses credible enough to convict, then the testimony
had to do with a weapon, and it becomes an ag robbery.
MR. BLAYLOCK:
mental state?

The question is, what was her

What did she intend?

And I think to not

allow us to submit the lesser included takes away from
us the argument that, "Okay, if she did not intend that
he use a knife, she certainly did intend that he commit
a robbery, an attempted robbery."
And I would suggest to the court that, based
upon the evidence that we have, I think both are
appropriate, and the jury has facts upon which either
could be found.

And that's the test for determining

whether or not a lesser included offense instruction is
appropriate.
THE COURT:

Mr. Mauro?

MR. MAURO:

You know, and it sort of leads me

to the next argument I wanted to make before the jury
comes in, and that would be an argument, obviously, that
the state has not shown a prima facie case.

If they
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don't believe that she committed an aggravated robbery,
i.e. that she didn't have the knife, that she didn't

J

encourage the use of the knife or intend to use the

1

knife, then this, as an alternative to that, then this
simply ought to go to the jury as a robbery.
What the state is saying, "Well, the evidence
is unclear.

We'll concede that ourselves by submitting

the instruction."

And you heard the testimony.

She

never had a knife or touched a knife or transferred a
knife or did anything with the knife.

It was the other

person.
THE COURT:

It's co-defendant liability that

we're talking about.
MR. MAURO:

Right.

THE COURT:

The state has the option of

charging it either way.
call up front.

You're right, they make the

But it seems to me that if the jury were

to believe all but the knife vis-a-vis this witness- But you don't have a robbery unless you have a threat.
To take something, or threatening conduct, to take
something from the immediate person or presence of
another, and you don't have that.

There's no threat

except the knife.
MR. BLAYLOCK:
THE COURT:

Well, there is a threat.

What is it?
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MR. BLAYLOCK:

The threat is, "She's wearing

shoes, get those shoes for me."

How else does he get

the shoes other than by taking them by force?

I mean

you don't go over and say- THE COURT:

But there's no expression of,

"I'll beat you to a pulp," or, "Give me those shoes or
I'll hit you."

I've just answered your own record, but

I'm not giving a lesser.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

If this court doesn't allow me

to give it, we don't take appeals from these kinds of
issues, but- THE COURT:

Well, what guides me, hopefully,

is what's right, not whether or not it's going to be
appealed.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

I understand that.

But Your

Honor, the position is, was she going to voluntarily
give up the shoes?
chased- -

Obviously not.

Force or fear, being

Even if you take the knife away, okay?
THE COURT:

But the witness testified that

the fear was as a result of the weapon.

The witness

testified that the mechanism to get the shoes from
her- -

Nobody tried grabbing them off her or anything.

The mechanism was the weapon.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

But the argument is, "I

intended for him to get the shoes from her because of
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the way I dire cted him,
a knife."

I didn't intend for him to use

So the jury could find that she intended for

him to get the shoes, but he exceeded, basically, her
authority or a gency by using the knife.
THE COURT:
are you, Mr. Mauro?

1

You're not going to argue that,
Because I think Mr. Blaylock's

correct.

If that's the argument that's going to be

made- -

First of all, there's nothing to support it,

because there' s nobody who's testified that she intended
something othe r than the use of a knife.

She's not

taking the stand, as I understand it.
So it seems to me that it would be
inappropriate to argue that.

That isn't your plan, is

it?
MR. MAURO:

I'm sorry, I was writing down

some notes, and I didn ft hear exactly what that was.
THE COURT:

Do you want to repeat it,

Mr. Blaylock?
MR. BLAYLOCK:

I believe that counsel's

already kind o f prefigured this argument by saying it
was the man.

It was not the woman.

The argument is,

she intended f or him to get the shoes, but she did not
intend for him to use the knife to get the shoes.
THE COURT:
intended.

It doesn't matter what she

She intended to have him get them for her,
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and then he engages in this conduct.
encouraged it.

She has solicited,

She doesn't need to know he's going to

pull out a knife.

She merely needs to be present for it

and to have solicited it or encouraged it or aided and
assisted in any other way.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

But I don't think that's clear

to the jury when the jury is also- THE COURT:

Then argue it.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

That the mental state doesn't

go to the use of a specific weapon.

The mental state

goes to the commission of the crime.
THE COURT:

Well, you'll have to argue it.

And you're entitled to.

But I guess my feeling is that

a lesser included is not appropriate.

It would also be

inappropriate for you to argue what she did as being
less than.

You can argue generically, I suppose.

But

don't go very far down that road or I'll stop you, okay?
MR. MAURO:

I don't think I have- -

I don't

think I did in opening.
THE COURT:

You have nothing to support it.

MR. MAURO:

I mean, I think I've made the

argument already that we would make.
THE COURT:

And that argument is?

MR. MAURO:

Well, we said it in opening, that

it's an interesting case, and even if you look at the
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conduct|r and the question, is, is the conduct even a
crime?

Which is what we had already argued.
The conduct is a crime, if the jury finds the

witness is credible, it is a crime to take somebody's
shoes, or threaten to take them at knife point.

And

even if she isn't the one with the knife, if they find
she was the one there soliciting, encouraging the
conduct, then it's aggravated robbery under the
elements.
THE COURT:

I'm going to have to substitute

the other instruction now.

The first robbery, ag

robbery instruction that was given that does not have
the lesser included language.
You made a valiant shot at it, Roger, but I'm
inclined to think that, as Mr. Mauro points out, I've
created an issue for you on appeal with our appellate
courts, where you're asking for it versus the defense.
Under these facts- -

But I'm going to watch how the

defense handles this, and you're not going to walk over
that line and argue that.

So that's where we are on

that.
Okay, remove the lessers, take a five-minute
break.

Dig up your witness, and I'm going to take these

down to be typed.
MR. MAURO:

And you'll get us a fresh copy of
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and then he engages in this conduct.
encouraged it.

She has solicited,

She doesn't need to know he's going to

pull out n knife.

She merely needs to be present for it

and to have solicited it or encouraged it or aided and
assisted in any other way.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

But I don't thi nk that's clear

to the jury when the jury is also- Then argue it.

THE COURT:

MR. BLrrLOCK:

That the mental state doesn't

go to the use of a specific weapon.

The mental state

goes to the commission of the crime.
THE COURT:

Well, you'll have to argue it.
But I guess my f eeling is that

And you're entitled to

a lesser included is n ot appropriate.

It would also be

inappropriate for you to argue what she d id as being
less than.

You can argue generically, I suppose.

But

don't gz very far down that road or I'll stop you, okay?
MR. MAURO:

I don't think I have- -

I don't

think I did in opening •
THE COURT:

You have nothing t o support it.

MR. MAURO:

I mean, I think I've made the

argument already that we would make.
THE COURT:

And that argument is?

MR. MAURO:

Well, we said it in opening, that

it's an interesting case, and even if you look at the
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conduct, and the guest ion, is, is the conduct even a
crime?

Which is what we had already argued.
The conduct is a crime, if the jury finds the

witness is credible, it is a crime to take somebody's
shoes, or threaten to take them at knife point.

And

even if she isn't the one with the knife, if they find
she was the one there soliciting, encouraging the
conductt then it's agg ravated robbery under the
elements.
THE COURT:

I'm going to have to substitute

the other instruction now.

The first robbery, ag

robbery instruction th at was given that does not have
the lesser included la nguage.
You made a valiant shot at it, Roger, but I'm
inclined to think that , as Mr. Mauro points out, I've
created an issue for y ou on appeal with our appellate
courts, where you're asking for it versus the defense.
Under these facts- -

But I'm going to watch how the

defense handles this, and you're not going to walk over
that line and argue that.

So that's where we are on

that.
Okay, remove the lessers, take a five-minute
break.

Dig up your wi tness, and I'm going to take these

down to be typed.
MR. MAURO:

And you'll get us a fresh copy of

0 CCo 7y
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those?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. MAURO:

Thank you.

(Br.ief recess)
THE COURT:

Mr. Mauro, you're ready?

MR. MAURO:

Yes, we are, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Let's have your witness come

forward to be Jsworn.

]Bring in the jury.

(Th<s jury entered the courtroom)

DR. DAVID DODD
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendant,
having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
as foil ows:
THE COURT:

You may be seated.

Ladies and

gentlemen, did you all bear in mind my admonition not to
discuss the case, even with one another, not to form an
opinion , but to keep an open mind?
did not ?

No hands are raised.
MR. MAURO:

Is there anyone who

You may continue.

Thank you, Your Honor.

And I

believe , just :for the ]record, that we had discussed a
motion that I .intended , but I had made that argument- THE COURT:
make that.

And you can reserve your right to

You did allude to your argument.
MR. MAURO:

Thank you, Your Honor.
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Addendum E

INSTRUCTION NO.

V\

Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

0 (K* 1 0 ;>

INSTRUCTION NO.

1

°i

Under the law of the State of Utah, robbery is the unlawful
and intentional taking or attempted taking of personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. A person
commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery,
or attempted robbery, that person uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon; or causes serious bodily injury upon another.

0 00i 0 i

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

Before you can convict the defendant, Diane Marie Nelson, of
the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the information,
you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt

each and every one of the following elements of that

offense:
1.

That on or about the 1st day of July, 1996, in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, the defendant, Diane Marie Nelson, as a
party, took or attempted to take personal property then in the
possession of Amy Brown, from the person or immediate presence of
Amy Brown; and
2.

That such taking or attempted taking was unlawful; and

3.

That such taking or attempted taking was intentional; and

4.

That such taking or attempted taking was against the will

of Amy Brown; and
5.

That such taking or attempted taking was accomplished by

means of force or fear; and
6.

That

in

the

course

of

committing

such

taking,

or

attempted taking dangerous weapon was used.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the
information.

If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond

a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements,
then you must find the defendant not guilty.

000108

INSTRUCTION NO.
"Unlawful11
unauthorized

by

means
law,

that
or,

which
without

«2 \
is

contrary

legal

to

law

justification,

or
or,

illegal.
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
"Personal property" mean anything of value, and includes
shoes.
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INSTRUCTION NO. prc*
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the
item, and:
(a)

the actor's use or apparent intended use of

the item leads the victim

to reasonably believe

the

item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;
or
(b)

the actor represents to the victim verbally

or in any other manner that the actor is in control of
such an item.
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or
causes

serious

impairment

permanent

disfigurement,

protracted

loss

or

of the function of any bodily member or organ, or

creates a substantial risk of death.
An

act

committing

shall

be

a robbery"

considered
if

it occurs

to

be

"in

the

in an attempt

course

of

to commit,

during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the
attempt or commission of a robbery.
An attempt occurs if a person is acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for the commission of an offense
and engages in conduct constituting a substantial step towards
commission of the offense.
Conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly

corroborative

of

the

person f s

intent

to

commit

the

offense.
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Addendum F

PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

76-2-202

PART 2
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF
ANOTHER
76-2-201. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Agent" means any director, officer, employee, or other person
authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association.
(2) "High managerial agent" means:
(a) A partner in a partnership;
(b) An officer of a corporation or association;
(c) An agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such
responsibility that his conduct reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association.
(3) "Corporation" means all organizations required by the laws of this
state or any other state to obtain a certificate of authority, a certificate of
incorporation, or other form of registration to transact business as a
corporation within this state or any other state and shall include domestic,
foreign, profit and nonprofit corporations, but shall not include a corporation sole, as such term is used in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated
1953. Lack of an appropriate certificate of authority, incorporation, or
other form of registration shall be no defense when such organization
conducted its business in a manner as to appear to have lawful corporate
existence.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-201.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia- § 224.
bility: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors, 1988
C.J.S. — 22 C. J.S. Criminal Law 5 127.
Utah L. Rev. 847.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 1,13.

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
History: C. 1963, 76-2-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196,1 76-2-202.
CroM-Referencee. — Aiding violation of

Wildlife Resources Code, j 23-20-23.
Obstructing justice, J 76-8-306.
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(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on
property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone
with apparent authority to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders;
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders.
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2Xa) is a class C misdemeanor unless it
was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the:
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained;
and
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use
of the property.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-206, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, t 76-6-206; 1974, ch. 32, < 15;
1992, ch. 14, i 2; 1996, ch. 142, 8 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, substituted the

present code citation for ''Subsection 78-1120(2)" in Subsection (2XaXi)
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301

PART 3
ROBBERY
76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1963, 76-6-801, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, { 76-6-901; 1996, ch. 222, f 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote Subsection (1), which had read "Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property

in the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, accompushed by means of force or fear," added Subsection (2), and redesignated former Subsection
(2) as (3).

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Included offense.
Proof of the elements of aggravated burglary
will never prove all the elements of aggravated

robbery, therefore, one is not a lesser included
offense of the other State v Brooks, 278 Utah
Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah 1995).

76-6-302

CRIMINAL CODE

find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's conduct constituted a "substantial step"
toward commission of the offense and that the
substantial step must be "strongly corroborative" of defendant's intent to commit the offense
was reversible error State v Harmon, 712 P2d
291 (Utah 1986)
Evidence.
—Sufficiency.
Possession of stolen property alone was not
sufficient to sustain conviction for robbery, but
its quality as evidence was of such high degree
that even slight corroborative proof of other
inculpatory circumstances would warrant conviction of felony murder based on intent to rob
State v Boyland, 27 Utah 2d 268, 495 P2d 315
(1972)
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for robbery See State v
Uhbam, 668 P2d 568 (Utah 1983) (theft from
convenience store)
—Testimony.
In prosecution for robbery based on defendant's alleged act of taking mone> from person
and presence of another, where defense was
that, if defendant actually was guilty of the act,
he took money under claim of ownership and in
honest belief that he had nght to it, defendant
had the right to testify as to his intent, belief,
and motive at time of alleged robbery, it was
error for trial court to refuse to permit him to
answer question, asked while he *as testifying
in his own behalf, as to whether at time when
he allegedly took the money, he honestly believed money was his and that he had a nght to
take it People v Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P
492 (1895)

Intent.
In determining whether the defendant had
an intent to commit robber>, the jury was
entitled to resort to reasonable inferences
based upon an examination of all the surrounding circumstances State v Gutierrez, 714 P 2d
295 (Utah 1986)
Taking of property.
Defendant who, at gunpoint, demanded
money from cashier of motel and then after
picking up money turned to walk out of motel
but was seized near doorway, subdued and
forced to drop the money had sufficiently
asportated the money to complete the cnme of
robbery, escape to place of temporary safet>
was not necessary to completion of cnme State
v Roberts, 30 Utah 2d 407, 518 P2d 1246
(1974)
Threats.
Where the victim was not misled by the use of
a firearm or a facsimile thereof, but rather b>
defendant's threatening words and gestures
while this certainly satisfies the elements of
robbery which must be accomplished by means
of force and fear, a second-degree felony, it does
not satisf} the elements of aggravated robber>
State v Sunmlle, 741 P2d 961 (Utah 1987)
(reducing conviction to robber} and remanding
for resentencing)
Cited m State v Morrell 803 P2d 292 (Utah
Ct App 1990), State v Adams, 830 P2d 310
(Utah Ct App 1992), State v Germonto, 868
P2d 50 (Utah 1993), Parsons v Barnes, 871
P2d 516 (Utah 1994)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am Jur 2d Robbery § 1
C.J.S. - 77 C J S Robbery § 3
AXJL — Earlier prosecution for offense during which homicide was committed as bar to
prosecution for homicide, 11 A L R 3d 834
Purse snatching as robbery or theft, 42
A L R 3d 1361

Prosecution for robbery of one Derson as bar
to subsequent prosecution for robbery of another person committed at the same time, 51
A L R 3d 693
Key Numbers. — Robbery *» 1

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
188
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(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-302; 1975, ch. 51, § 1;
1989, ch. 170, § 7; 1994, ch. 271, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, added Subsection
(1X0.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
knife, facsimile thereof, or another deadly
weapon, or the accused causes serious bodily
injury, the elements of aggravated robbery are
satisfied. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah
1988); State v. Hickman, 779 P2d 670 (1989).

ANALYSIS

Elements of offense.
Entrapment defense unavailable.
Evidence.
— Insufficient.
—Prior convictions.
—Sufficient.
Eyewitness identification.
Included offense.
Indictment or information.
Intent.
Recent possession of stolen property.
Recovery of property by force.
Sentence.
—Use of a firearm.
Threatening to use weapon.
Unloaded firearm.
Cited.

Entrapment defense unavailable.
Defendant, charged with aggravated robbery
under Subsection (l)(a), was not entitled to the
defense of entrapment, because the threat of
bodily injury, which precludes entrapment, was
a necessarily implied element of the offense
charged. State v. Colonna, 766 P2d 1062 (Utah
1988).
Evidence.

Elements of offense.
In prosecution for robbery with revolver,
based on defendant's alleged act of taking
money from another, where defense was that, if
defendant actually was guilty of the act, he took
money under claim of ownership and in honest
belief that he had right to it as result of card
game, it was error for court to give instruction
whereby jury was authorized to convict defendant notwithstanding absence of felonious intent. People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492
(1895).
All essential elements were proved where
evidence showed defendant took $120 on March
10 though charged with taking $140 on March
9, and where the victim testified the defendant
had a gun stuck in the front of his jeans but
evidence did not show defendant handled or
pointed a gun and the gun was not found after
the robbery. The date charged need only be
closely proximated, the value of personal property taken is not an element of robbery, and
proof that the gun was actually pointed and
placing the gun in evidence are not necessary
since if mere exhibition of a gun places the
victim in fear it constitutes "use of a firearm."
In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1979).
Proof of all elements necessary to prove a
robbery is not required; so long as there is an
attempt, coupled with the use of a firearm,

—Insufficient.
Defendant's conviction was reversed, because
the circumstantial evidence connecting him to
his alleged accomplice and the crime was insufficient to prove that he was with the accomplice
during or immediately after the robbery or that
he had the requisite mental state for the crime
with which he was charged. State v. Kalisz, 735
P.2d 60 (Utah 1987).
Defendant's menacing gesture accompanied
by verbal threats was not sufficient evidence
alone to establish the use of a firearm or a
facsimile of a firearm. State v. Suniville, 741
P2d 961 (Utah 1987).
—Prior convictions.
Admission of evidence of defendant's previous convictions for burglary and robbery was
prejudicial error, where the evidence of his guilt
was far from overwhelming and one of the
identification witnesses was involved in the
robbery and had questionable motives for identifying defendant. State v. Lanier, 778 P2d 9
(Utah 1989).
—Sufficient.
Positive identification of defendant and his
clothing by robbery victim, and defendant's
fresh thumb print on a poster which defendant
had handled while in the place he robbed,
sustained trial court's finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333
(Utah 1979).
Evidence supported conviction of defendant
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